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1. Introduction
One topic that has engendered much recent interest in the financial world is short
selling. A number of studies show that short sellers on average appear to be able to
predict short-term abnormal returns. The source of this “skill” is a matter of debate.
For example, some statements in the popular press and by government officials assert
that short selling activity tends to artificially drive down prices. Recent academic
studies consider several other possibilities, including risk-bearing (cf. Ho and Stoll,
1981; Diether, Lee and Werner, 2009), liquidity provision (Grossman and Miller,
1988; Diether, Lee and Werner, 2009), and trading savvy (Boehmer, Jones and Zhang,
2008). Our study examines how short sellers react to an overpricing event arising
from overoptimism on the part of some investors. If one source of short sellers’ skill
in predicting short-term returns is to exploit the behavioral biases of some investors,
we would expect to see increased short selling following an overpricing event even
after controlling for other factors previously shown to affect shorting activity.
We examine short selling following the airing of Jim Cramer’s stock recommen-
dations on Mad Money, a CNBC television show—an event that is widely held to
give rise to overoptimism for a subset of investors. Several factors make Mad Money
a favorable setting in which to examine short selling when there is overpricing. First,
Cramer provides a copious number of buy recommendations in a typical month (over
100 made independently of viewer input). Second, Mad Money airs after the U.S.
stock markets close, providing a clear event date, making it easier to measure a price
reaction compared with other events that might cause overoptimism, such as recom-
mendations by high profile analysts in the printed press or on the Internet. Finally,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s Regulation SHO, which is in
effect during our sampling period, enables the use of daily short selling data.
Consistent with earlier research, we find a significant abnormal return following
buy recommendations made on Mad Money and a subsequent reversal, indicative of
an overpricing event. We also report a large increase in the amount of short selling.
To examine whether potentially significant overpricing events such as Cramer’s buy
recommendations influence the level of short selling beyond that which is already
explained by factors known to influence shorting activity, we estimate panel regres-
sions of daily shorting activity similar to Diether, Lee and Werner (2009). The panel
regressions include controls for past returns, past shorting activity, stock volatility,
turnover, and bid-ask spread as well as concurrent returns. We examine relative short-
ing (relss), which equals daily shorting volume divided by daily total volume, and,
as an alternative, absolute measure, Short value, which equals the log of the market
value of shares sold short for the day.
Our main finding is that there is a positive association between short selling
and Mad Money buy recommendations, even after controlling for a number of other
factors previously shown to impact shorting activity. The association between short
selling and buy recommendations differs somewhat between NYSE and Nasdaq
stock recommendations. For buy recommendations of NYSE stocks, where abnormal
returns are smaller than for Nasdaq stock recommendations, the coefficient estimates
for a dummy variable for Cramer buys are consistently positive and significant. For
Nasdaq buys, we find a stronger association between short selling and prior overnight
returns (and alternately the concurrent daily return) following the recommendation.
These findings support the hypothesis that at least some of the comparative skill of
short sellers lies in the ability to exploit behavioral biases associated with overpricing
events such as Mad Money.
As a robustness check, we also compare the level of short selling following buy
recommendations with shorting for a matched sample based on overnight returns, as
a test of whether our panel regression results are driven by higher overnight returns
following a buy recommendation. In nearly all of our regression specifications, we
find that shorting either increases markedly subsequent to Cramer buy recommenda-
tions or increases as a function of stock returns around Cramer recommendations, or
both. Thus, even when we compare shorting behavior around Mad Money recommen-
dations with other days with similar overnight returns, the “Cramer effect” remains
strong. Finally, we control for earnings announcements that occur near the recom-
mendation date and thus could potentially confound our results. We find, however,
that the results remain unchanged.
Finally, we examine short selling following Mad Money sell recommendations.
The results differ from those of buy recommendations. NYSE stock sell recommen-
dations exhibit relatively small negative abnormal returns and little change in short
selling activity. The average return for Nasdaq sells is −1.7% and accompanies an
increase in short selling. In our panel regressions of daily short selling for the NYSE
sample, we find no consistent association between short selling and sell recommen-
dations. For Nasdaq stock sell recommendations, we find some evidence of a negative
association between short selling and sell recommendations.
2. Literature
Several studies empirically examine the association between short selling and
overpricing. Lamont and Stein (2004) show that total short interest tends to move
counter-cyclically; short selling actually takes place less often in a bull market than
in a bear market. The authors thus conclude that short selling does very little to
correct overpricing. Subsequently, however, some evidence indicates that short selling
does mitigate overpricing. Christophe, Ferri and Angel (2004) find that in the week
immediately preceding earnings announcements, the stocks with the highest volume
of short sales experience the worst performance afterward, particularly for those
stocks with the potential for large subsequent price decreases, and attribute their
finding to “informed trading” by short sellers. Kolasinski, Cao, Reed and Dhaliwal
(2007) find that short sellers often profit on the market’s underreaction to negative
earnings surprises. Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007) report that negative abnormal
returns tend to follow an increase in shorting demand, especially for cases where the
level of privately held information is high. Diether, Lee and Werner (2009) use data
mandated by the SEC to show that short sellers are more active after positive returns
and are able to correctly predict when negative returns follow. Last, Boehmer, Jones
and Zhang (2008) find that heavily shorted stocks underperform their counterparts,
suggesting that short sellers can correctly identify overpricing.
However, there are factors apart from overpricing that help determine the level
of shorting activity for different stocks. Diether, Lee and Werner (2009) note that
the association between shorting and (near-term) returns can alternatively stem from
short sellers’ inside information, the exploitation of market frictions or investors’
behavioral biases, liquidity provision to mitigate order imbalances, or temporary
risk-bearing. One can explore this issue in detail by comparing the factors that
determine shorting in a more general sense to those surrounding specific overpricing
events. It is possible that during such events, overpricing becomes a larger factor,
in which case the event itself should have some incremental impact or the returns
surrounding it should become more strongly associated with short selling. It is also
possible that such overpricing events are of such a substantial magnitude that other
factors become relatively unimportant to the overall level of shorting. Finally, it is
possible that because of the high uncertainty associated with such events, these other
factors subsume any marginal effect of overpricing on the shorting.
This paper examines short selling with regard to the popular television show
Mad Money, hosted by Jim Cramer. Several studies conclude that Mad Money in-
fuses excessive optimism in many investors who follow the show, resulting in share
price inflation above true underlying value. Bolster and Trahan (2009) find that
buy recommendations preceded short-term gains, followed by a reversal within one
month. Engelberg, Sasseville and Williams (2011) report an overnight return follow-
ing Cramer’s recommendations of 3% overall and nearly 7% for small-cap stocks.
The authors also noted that as early as the day after a recommendation, shorting
volume increases. Neumann and Kenny (2007) find that most of the first-day reaction
to Cramer’s recommendations actually takes place the night before, and suggest that
investment professionals might be able to exploit such recommendations by short
selling. Lim and Rosario (2010) find that most of Cramer’s buy recommendations
recently performed well, and of those that did perform well the small-cap stocks
continued to perform well over the next six months. Keasler and McNeil (2010)
find that a reversal takes place over the 25 trading days following the initial reaction
to Cramer’s recommendations, with no evidence of positive longer-term abnormal
returns.
We present our study as follows. Section 3 provides background information on
Mad Money, our sample selection process, and descriptive statistics of the companies
that Cramer recommends to his audience during the sample period. Section 4 provides
the results of our tests of the impact of Cramer recommendations and stock returns
on short selling. In Section 5, we conduct an alternative test using a matched sample
based on overnight returns, and also perform a robustness check in which we control
for earnings announcements that occur near Cramer’s recommendations. Section 6
concludes the paper.
3. Sample and descriptive statistics
3.1. Mad money background
On March 14, 2005, Jim Cramer’s Mad Money premiered on CNBC. By the
end of 2006, the show had become very successful and Cramer was the “network’s
biggest star” (see Feinberg, 2006). The recording of Mad Money occurs at 4:30 p.m. on
weekdays, and first airs at 6:00 p.m., after the closing of the financial markets. It is re-
aired later in the evening. Jim Cramer draws on 20 years of experience stock brokering
and managing a successful hedge fund. The recommendations made on Mad Money,
particularly during the show’s “discussion segment,” derive from Cramer’s personal
research. Another section of the show, the “lightning round,” features fast responses to
questions from callers regarding individual stocks. The overall tenor of Mad Money
is very different from that of most current and past financial television programs;
Cramer can often be seen gesturing emphatically, throwing objects such as plastic
bulls and bears, shouting, and hitting buttons that trigger sound effects in the studio.
According to Cramer, the primary goal of Mad Money is to both entertain and educate
his audience.
3.2. Sample
We collect a list of Mad Money recommendations from TheStreet.com, which
was co-founded by Jim Cramer and which publicly displays the recommendations
made on Mad Money for a period of three months after the show date. Our sample
consists of recommendations made during the 11 month period of February 2006
through December 2006. TheStreet.com identifies each Mad Money recommendation
using the show segment during which it was made (discussion segment or lightning
round) as well as its nature (sell, negative mention, positive mention or buy).
We also require that each stock for which Cramer issues a buy recommendation
has sufficient data available from the CRSP and have a CRSP exchange code of
either 1 (NYSE) or 3 (Nasdaq) to be included in our daily regressions. Finally, we
examine only those stocks for which daily short selling data are available from the
Arca, NYSE, Nasdaq or NSX exchanges.1 The SEC’s Regulation SHO required that
exchanges report daily short selling activity starting January 2005 and ending August
2007.
3.3. Descriptive statistics
Our sample consists of 1,234 discussion-round buy recommendations made
on Mad Money from February 2006 through December 2006. Of these 1,234 buy
1 The National Stock Exchange (NSX) is an electronic stock exchange that was recently located in Chicago
and is now officially located in New Jersey.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
This table contains descriptive statistics for our sample of stocks for which Mad Money buy or sell
recommendations occur during the period of February 2006 through December 2006. We classify the
sample into four categories by recommendation and exchange listing. The table contains a separate panel
for each category. Market Cap is in billions of $s as of the day of the recommendation. Relss is relative
shorting (in percentage), computed as daily shorting volume divided by daily total volume. Short value is
the log of market value of shares sold short for a day, Spread is a percentage and equals (ask − bid)/((ask
+ bid)/2). Relss (average), Short value (average), and Spread (average) are the daily mean computed over
February 2006 through December 2006 by stock recommendation.
Lower Upper
Mean Median quartile quartile Minimum Maximum N
Panel A: NYSE buy
Market Cap 31.92 12.06 3.50 34.80 0.01 443.41 779
Relss (average) 23.50 23.46 19.85 26.96 12.98 36.94 779
Short value (average) 16.60 16.70 15.72 17.75 9.44 19.34 779
Spread (average) 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.52 779
Panel B: Nasdaq buy
Market Cap 23.01 1.94 0.70 23.07 0.04 294.13 455
Relss (average) 33.33 32.96 30.36 36.29 17.85 46.16 455
Short value (average) 16.44 16.12 14.74 18.14 10.47 20.62 455
Spread (average) 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.71 455
Panel C: NYSE sell
Market Cap 24.48 10.86 3.45 24.56 0.05 200.61 161
Relss (average) 23.28 23.03 19.89 26.02 11.79 39.22 161
Short value (average) 16.48 16.69 15.79 17.37 10.37 19.17 161
Spread (average) 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.034 0.65 161
Panel D: Nasdaq sell
Market Cap 14.74 1.80 0.56 6.81 0.05 232.79 135
Relss (average) 32.33 33.58 30.55 37.58 5.09 44.03 135
Short value (average) 16.02 16.23 14.41 17.48 9.57 19.90 135
Spread (average) 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.02 1.00 135
recommendations, 779 are for stocks listed on the NYSE, while the other 455 repre-
sent Nasdaq-listed stocks. Additionally, we examine 296 sell recommendations. Of
these sell recommendations, 161 trade on the NYSE and 135 trade on Nasdaq. These
recommendations yield 703 unique identification numbers from the CRSP database
(Cramer recommends some stocks more than once during our sampling period).
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the four categories of stocks as clas-
sified by the type of recommendation (buy or sell) and by exchange listing. The
descriptive statistics show that the NYSE-listed stocks in our sample tend to have
greater market capitalizations, smaller bid-ask spreads (defined as ask price minus
bid price divided by the average of the ask and bid—see Chung and Zhang, 2011), and
Table 2
Daily abnormal returns and short selling
This table presents average daily abnormal returns and average short selling by day for our sample of
stock recommendations made on Mad Money. Panel A summarizes results for 779 NYSE stock buy
recommendations and 455 Nasdaq stock buy recommendations. Panel B summarizes results for 161
NYSE stock sell recommendations and 135 Nasdaq stock sell recommendations. Day 0 is the day of the
recommendation. Abnormal return is a percentage and is estimated using the market model. CAAR denotes
cumulative average abnormal returns, accumulated beginning on day +1. Short percentage is computed
as total shares sold short for the day as a percentage of total outstanding shares. Statistical significance of
Abnormal return and CAAR is indicated by asterisks.
(2) (5)
(1) NYSE (3) (4) Nasdaq (6)
Abnormal Short Abnormal Short
Day return CAAR percentage return CAAR percentage
Panel A: Buy recommendations
−20 −0.019 0.250 0.069 0.608
−15 0.101 0.262 −0.136 0.597
−10 −0.019 0.265 0.121 0.613
−5 0.053 0.260 0.434∗∗∗ 0.723
−4 −0.032 0.285 0.108 0.648
−3 0.082∗ 0.294 0.009 0.643
−2 0.036 0.289 0.252∗∗∗ 0.671
−1 0.200∗∗ 0.311 0.266∗∗∗ 0.725
0 0.301∗∗∗ 0.363 0.132 0.831
1 0.842∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.465 1.722∗∗∗ 1.722∗∗∗ 1.428
2 −0.062 0.780∗∗∗ 0.352 −0.119 1.603∗∗∗ 0.926
3 −0.148∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.336 −0.089 1.514∗∗∗ 0.844
4 0.004 0.636∗∗∗ 0.317 −0.303∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗ 0.772
5 −0.094 0.542∗∗∗ 0.295 −0.255∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.652
6 −0.095∗ 0.448∗ 0.290 −0.137 0.820∗∗ 0.625
7 −0.154∗∗∗ 0.294 0.289 −0.252∗∗ 0.567∗ 0.666
8 −0.085 0.210 0.277 −0.061 0.507 0.651
9 −0.026 0.183 0.274 −0.156 0.351 0.672
10 −0.037 0.153 0.275 −0.229 0.112 0.652
11 −0.047 0.106 0.267 −0.207∗∗ −0.095 0.617
12 −0.059 0.047 0.285 0.120 0.025 0.610
13 −0.147∗∗∗ −0.101 0.275 −0.195 −0.170 0.663
14 −0.147∗∗∗ −0.248 0.265 −0.091 −0.260 0.667
15 −0.057 −0.305∗ 0.255 −0.209 −0.469 0.673
20 −0.022 −0.680∗∗∗ 0.259 −0.159 −1.396∗ 0.633
(Continued)
less shorting (relative to turnover) than do the Nasdaq-listed stocks. Our measures of
relss are very similar to those of Diether, Lee and Werner (2009), who report averages
of 23.89 for NYSE stocks and 31.33 for Nasdaq stocks.
Table 2 displays the average daily abnormal returns, cumulative average ab-
normal returns (CAAR), and percentage of shares sold short for each of the four
Table 2 (continued)
Daily abnormal returns and short selling
(2) (5)
(1) NYSE (3) (4) Nasdaq (6)
Abnormal Short Abnormal Short
Day return CAAR percentage return CAAR percentage
Panel B: Sell recommendations
−20 −0.309∗ 0.255 −0.133 0.754
−15 −0.185 0.250 −0.007 0.635
−10 −0.014 0.258 0.135 0.583
−5 0.056 0.245 −0.069 0.622
−4 −0.415∗∗ 0.284 −0.010 0.673
−3 −0.062 0.298 0.423 0.956
−2 −0.141 0.326 0.749∗∗ 0.860
−1 −0.688∗ 0.383 0.017 0.802
0 0.048 0.360 −0.851 1.103
1 −0.283∗∗ −0.283∗∗ 0.279 −1.705∗∗∗ −1.705∗∗∗ 1.167
2 −0.072 −0.355∗ 0.256 −0.012 −1.717∗∗ 0.808
3 −0.070 −0.425∗ 0.246 −0.024 −1.741∗∗ 0.676
4 0.084 −0.341 0.267 −0.271 −2.012∗∗ 0.701
5 0.004 −0.338 0.270 −0.363 −2.376∗∗ 0.610
6 0.466∗∗∗ 0.128 0.280 0.294 −2.082∗ 0.644
7 0.085 0.213 0.294 0.173∗ −1.909 0.609
8 −0.019 0.194 0.252 0.244 −1.665 0.567
9 0.006 0.200 0.307 0.314∗ −1.351 0.564
10 0.226∗ 0.426 0.276 0.442 −0.909 0.614
11 0.094 0.520 0.236 0.052 −0.858 0.644
12 −0.095 0.425 0.239 −0.327 −1.185 0.569
13 0.329 0.754 0.263 −0.059 −1.244 0.578
14 0.217 0.971 0.248 −0.183 −1.427 0.533
15 0.217 1.188 0.243 0.340∗ −1.087 0.576
20 0.025 1.298∗ 0.257 −0.046 −1.153 0.571
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
recommendation/exchange categories. Panel A provides event-period data for buy
recommendations, while Panel B pertains to sell recommendations. We estimate
abnormal returns using the traditional market model, with the parameters estimated
over trading days −125 through −26 relative to the recommendation date. Consistent
with prior research, we find significant positive abnormal returns within both “buy”
subsamples the day after Jim Cramer’s recommendations are aired on Mad Money. In
absolute terms, the “bump” tends to be smaller for NYSE-listed stocks (0.842% on
Day +1) than for Nasdaq-listed stocks (1.722%). Also consistent with prior literature,
we witness a reversal beginning on Day +2. The reversal is measured relative to the
Day +1 abnormal return. For the NYSE-listed subset of stocks, almost half of the
first-day CAAR disappears within five trading days and all of the first-day CAAR
disappears within 12 trading days. For the Nasdaq-listed subset, the half-reversal
completes in five trading days while the full-reversal completes in ten trading days.
Additionally, we observe a spike in short selling activity around the time of the
buy recommendation, most prominently on Day +1. For the NYSE-listed stocks,
Short percentage (computed as the number of shares sold short for the day divided
by total shares outstanding) averages 0.465% on Day +1, up from 0.363% for the
day before. For Nasdaq-listed stocks, shorting jumps to 1.428% on Day +1, up
from 0.831% and 0.725% for the preceding two days. The level of shorting tends to
remain high, relative to shorting in the days leading up to the buy recommendation,
for several days afterward. To summarize, the reversal following these high initial
returns is strongly indicative of overpricing, while the jump in shorting on Day +1
suggests that short sellers react to it.
For sell recommendations (Panel B), we also see an increase in shorting activity,
though it tends to begin a day or two earlier and is less pronounced than it is for
buy recommendations. As with buy recommendations, shorting constitutes a much
higher percentage of shares outstanding for Nasdaq-listed stocks than for NYSE-
listed stocks. In addition, the increase in shorting activity occurs on the same days as
the most negative abnormal returns, suggesting that some part of the short selling that
occurs on Day +1 (after Cramer’s sell recommendation) is due to bearish momentum
trading.
Many of the variables that we examine are possibly correlated. Table 3 provides
the correlation matrix for all of these variables. Not surprisingly, many of these cor-
relation coefficients are significant; the shorting relates positively to recent shorting,
contemporaneous returns, bid-ask spread, current and past volatility, and past trad-
ing. In addition, returns relate inversely to spread, lagged shorting, current volatility,
and past trading. Not surprisingly, volatility and spread are also positively corre-
lated. Relss and Short value relate positively and significantly. However, since both
are measures of short selling, one would expect the correlation between them to be
positive. Given that the correlation coefficient is only 0.13 for the NYSE sample
and 0.32 for the Nasdaq subsample, we believe that the two measures are differ-
ent enough to qualify as alternative dependent variables on which to conduct our
analysis.
4. Panel regressions
4.1. Overview of the factors that affect shorting
Diether, Lee and Werner (2009) examine a number of variables to determine
which generally affect short selling, and to what degree. These variables include
current and past returns, order imbalances, bid-ask spread, current volatility, and
recent volatility. In addition, they control for recent shorting activity and turnover.
For some of our shorting regressions, we include the size of the bump (the
overnight return measured from the close of day t−1 until the open of day t). We
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hypothesize that the association between overnight return and shorting will increase
following specific events that prospective short sellers deem to result in overpricing.
4.2. Main results
To determine whether recommendations made on Mad Money, and the returns
surrounding those recommendations, influence short selling, we estimate a series
of panel regressions. Similar to Diether, Lee and Werner (2009), we control for a
number of variables that have been shown in the literature to influence shorting, and
we employ two-way clustering by stock and calendar date (see Thompson, 2011).
We use two alternative measures of shorting as our dependent variable. “Relss” is the
daily volume of short selling scaled by the daily volume of all trading. “Short value”
is the natural logarithm of raw dollar volume of short sales. In those regressions for
which Short value is the dependent variable, we include “Nonshort value”—total
dollar volume minus the dollar volume of shorting—as an additional explanatory
variable, replace lagged turnover (“tvlag”) with “Tradevalulag,” the average of total
dollar volume over the preceding five trading days, and replace the lag of relss with
the lag of Short value.
Table 4 provides the main results of our paper. We include a dummy variable that
assumes a value of one on the trading day following a Mad Money buy recommenda-
tion (“Buy”) or sell recommendation (“Sell”). To examine the effect of Mad Money
recommendations on the association between returns and shorting in the context of
overpricing, we also include interactions between the recommendation dummy and
the contemporaneous return (ret × Buy) and between the recommendation dummy
and overnight return (ret_nite × Buy). Further, ret is decomposed into the afore-
mentioned overnight return variable (ret_nite) and the close-to-open return for the
next day (ret day), to yield further insight into the association between the timing of
returns and short selling.
For Jim Cramer’s buy recommendations of NYSE stocks, relative shorting re-
lates positively to recent shorting activity, the stock’s current volatility, and its con-
current as well as its recent return. Relative shorting (relss) relates negatively to
recent turnover. The dummy variable is positive and highly significant, indicating
that Cramer’s buy recommendations have an effect on shorting (an increase of 1.1%
to 1.2% per columns (1) and (2)) even after we control for other factors shown to
be influential in the literature. Both interactions with returns are insignificant. Raw
dollar shorting (Short value) relates similarly to these explanatory variables, with the
buy recommendation dummy again positive and highly significant. The coefficients
of 0.123 and 0.138 imply a 13% to 15% increase (columns (3) and (4)) in the raw
market value of shares shorted (Short value is a log variable) that is attributable
to Cramer’s buy recommendation. Unlike in the relss regressions, both interaction
terms (ret × Buy and ret_nite × Buy) are also positive and highly significant, with a
1% increase in ret following a buy recommendation leading to an additional 2.91%
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increase in shorting above its normal (nonrecommendation) effect and a 1% increase
in overnight return leading to a 5.21% increase.
For the Nasdaq subsample of Mad Money buy recommendations, relss again
relates positively to concurrent return, past return, concurrent volatility, and recent
shorting and negatively to recent turnover. Relative shorting also corresponds posi-
tively to recent volatility and negatively to spread. For relss, the buy recommendation
dummy is insignificant, but both interactions between the dummy and concurrent
returns are positive and highly significant. When Short value is the modeled response
variable, the results are similar, though recent volatility switches sign and the recom-
mendation dummy becomes positive and highly significant. All interactions remain
positive and highly significant. Thus a Mad Money buy recommendation leads to
an increase in dollar shorting volume of 7–12.5%, while a 1% increase in the day’s
return leads to an additional increase of roughly 5.8% above its normal effect, and a
1% increase in overnight return leads to an increase of about 8.1% above its normal
effect.2
For sell recommendations (Panel B of Table 4), the level of shorting relates
similarly to the control variables as it did for buy recommendations. Within the
NYSE subsample, the sell recommendation dummy is everywhere insignificant, and
the interactions between Sell and event period returns are generally insignificant.
Within the Nasdaq subsample, Sell is a negative and significant predictor of relss,
though it relates insignificantly to Short value. The interaction terms are negative and
marginally to highly significant.
Overall, we conclude that Table 4 supports the hypothesis that the mere existence
of a Mad Money buy recommendation ties closely to an increase in short selling. Thus,
it appears that at least part of short sellers’ skill derives from an ability to exploit
overpricing events such as Jim Cramer’s buy recommendations. We interpret the
positive association between shorting and the recommendation dummy as indicative
that Cramer does have an effect incremental to factors that affect short selling. The
positive association between the dummy and contemporaneous returns is indicative
that those returns become even more determinative of shorting when they immediately
follow buy recommendations.
5. Robustness
5.1. Robustness check 1: Matching on the basis of overnight return
Our results have shown that the returns immediately following buy recom-
mendations on Mad Money generally have an influence on shorting. However, one
concern might be that we have not adequately controlled for the fact that the av-
erage overnight returns immediately following recommendations differ from those
2 Because Short value is the natural log of shorting volume, the conversion of the coefficient into raw
dollar value shorted is: coefficient = ln(1+r), where r is the percent change in the shorting volume.
on other days. To address the concern, we match each observation in our sample
of Buy recommendations to the day (for the same stock) from the period February
2006 through December 2006 that most closely matches its post-recommendation
overnight return (the matching day must fall outside of days −4 through +6, relative
to Cramer’s recommendation). If the stock does not experience a return within 10%
of its overnight return3 on any other nonexcluded day of the year, we substitute the
closest match from another stock in our overall sample within the same exchange. In
most cases the second step was not necessary; we were able to match roughly 85%
of buy recommendations to the same stock.
Table 5 shows the results of our matched-sample experiment, estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS), in which the variable “Buy” takes a value of one if the
observation is a Mad Money recommendation and zero if it is from the overnight re-
turn based matched sample. For buy recommendations of NYSE stocks, relss relates
positively and significantly to the open-to-close (ret day) return and (alternatively) to
the close-to-close return (ret). It relates insignificantly to overnight return (ret_nite),
and positively to average lagged shorting. The coefficients on the recommendation
day dummy and its interactions with ret and overnight returns are positive but in-
significant. In two unreported regressions where the interaction term was dropped,
the buy recommendation dummy became marginally significant. For Nasdaq buy
recommendation regressions on relss, lagged shorting is again significantly negative,
whereas the coefficients on concurrent volatility and concurrent return are insignifi-
cant. However, both of the return interaction terms are positive and significant at the
1% level.
When Short value is used as the dependent variable instead of relss (with
non-shorting volume included as a control variable), the coefficients on spread,
lagged shorting, concurrent volatility, and nonshorting volume are all positive and
significant for the NYSE subsample. The coefficients on recent volatility and recent
trading volume are negative and significant. More notably for our purposes, the
buy recommendation dummy is significant at the 1% level, and its interactions with
the overnight and next day returns are positive but insignificant. For the Nasdaq
subsample regression on Short value, spread and the recommendation dummy become
insignificant as in Table 4, while both interactions between the recommendation
dummy and concurrent returns remain positive and become significant at the 1%
level.
Overall, we interpret the dummy and return interaction coefficients from Table 5
as being supportive of the hypothesis that Mad Money recommendations have an
influence on shorting incremental to that which is determined by known factors,
while matching to control for overnight returns. Generally, the results from Table 4
are robust to the results of the matched sample exercise (with the possible exception of
3 That is, the absolute value of matching day ret nite minus recommendation ret nite, all divided by the
absolute value of recommendation ret nite, must be less than or equal to 10%.
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the relss regressions for the NYSE subsample). Where the recommendation dummy
is positive and significant, we interpret Cramer’s recommendations as an inducement
to sell short, above and beyond several other important factors. Where the interaction
terms are positive and significant, we interpret Cramer’s recommendations as making
the subsequent returns an even more important factor in the decision to short the
stock.
5.2. Robustness check 2: Earnings announcements
It is possible that there are confounding news events occurring around the time
of Jim Cramer’s buy recommendations. One potential concern is that earnings an-
nouncements could motivate Cramer to issue recommendations, which could affect
the degree of shorting as well as our measures of current and recent returns and
control variables. With specific regard to short selling, Christophe, Ferri and Angel
(2004) find significant effects from earnings announcements occurring over the pre-
ceding five trading days that also relate to subsequent abnormal returns. To examine
whether our results are robust to their findings, we download firm-level earnings an-
nouncement data from Bloomberg4 and estimate panel regressions similar to Table 4
but with a refined dummy variable (“BuyNoEarn”) for buy recommendations that are
uncontaminated by contemporaneous earnings announcements (we classify a recom-
mendation as uncontaminated if we can ascertain that the trading day immediately
following it does not fall within days (−5, +2) of an earnings announcement).
Table 6 displays the results for our sample of Mad Money buy recommendations.
Of the 1,234 buy recommendations in our initial sample, 1,137 had sufficient earnings
announcement data to determine whether the recommendations were contaminated.
Of those 1,137 recommendations, 217 occurred within (−5, +2) trading days of an
earnings announcement.
The results turn out to be very similar to those in Table 4. When we regress
on relative shorting (relss), the BuyNoEarn recommendation dummy is positive and
significant for the NYSE-listed stocks, while the interaction terms are positive but
insignificant. For the Nasdaq-listed subsample of stocks, the interaction terms are
positive and highly significant while BuyNoEarn is positive but insignificant. When
we estimate our regressions on Short value, both the redefined buy recommenda-
tion dummy and the interactions with return are positive and highly significant for
the NYSE as well as the Nasdaq-listed stocks. The other variables have similar
coefficients and significance as in Table 4; for example, current and recent return,
current and recent volatility, and recent shorting are all positive and highly significant
predictors of both relss and Short value.
4 There is some evidence that the Bloomberg database provides more accurate information on earnings
announcements than does IBES (see, e.g., Barber, De George, Lehavy and Trueman, 2011).
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We interpret the main results from Table 6 as being consistent with those of
Table 4. Cramer’s effect on short sellers largely relates to buy recommendations,
and that effect appears to be robust to earnings announcements as well as to other
control variables included in the regressions. Thus it appears that the existence of a
Cramer buy recommendation incrementally increases the level of short selling while
the effect of returns on shorting strengthens.
6. Conclusions
We examine 1,234 discussion segment buy recommendations issued on Jim
Cramer’s Mad Money television program from February 2006 through December
2006. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recommended stocks enjoy a
positive abnormal return in the short-run, followed quickly by a reversal (negative ab-
normal returns) for both NYSE- and Nasdaq-listed sample stocks. We also show that
these stocks experience an increase in short selling the day after the recommendation.
We examine Cramer’s buy recommendations across two dimensions—we mea-
sure the importance of the recommendation itself as well as the importance of the
post-recommendation return on short selling. We control for several factors that are
known to generally influence short selling. These factors include stock returns over
the recent past, recent turnover of the company’s stock, the stock’s volatility both con-
currently and over the recent past, the stock’s bid-ask spread, and recent short selling
activity, following Diether, Lee and Werner (2009). In a series of panel regressions,
we find that the existence of a Cramer buy recommendation increases shorting activ-
ity beyond that which is explained by the other factors. Additionally, the association
between post-recommendation stock returns and shorting strengthens.
We include a further robustness check by matching our sample of Mad Money
recommendations to a sample of nonrecommendation days by overnight return. The
results are similar to those of the panel regressions. Last, we examine whether Jim
Cramer’s “recommendation effect” is robust to earnings announcements occurring
around the same time. The results remain very similar to those of the panel regressions
from Table 4.
Alternatively, we examine Mad Money sell recommendations, and find that they
are generally less deterministic of short selling than are buy recommendations. Thus,
the main effect of Mad Money on shorting appears to come from buy recommenda-
tions. In addition, we conclude that the stronger (more positive) association between
returns and shorting following a buy recommendation lends support to the hypothesis
that short sellers’ comparative skill includes the ability to exploit behavioral biases
that result in the overpricing of Cramer-recommended stocks.
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